The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan Revisited: Proceedings of a Panel Discussion on the Japanese Legal Profession after the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2011 Tōhuku Earthquake by Aronson, Bruce E.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 21 Number 2 
3-1-2012 
The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan Revisited: Proceedings 
of a Panel Discussion on the Japanese Legal Profession after the 
2008 Financial Crisis and the 2011 Tōhuku Earthquake 
Bruce E. Aronson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce E. Aronson, The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan Revisited: Proceedings of a Panel 
Discussion on the Japanese Legal Profession after the 2008 Financial Crisis and the 2011 Tōhuku 
Earthquake, 21 Pac. Rim L & Pol'y J. 255 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol21/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
 THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF LAWYERS IN JAPAN 
REVISITED: PROCEEDINGS OF A PANEL DISCUSSION 
ON THE JAPANESE LEGAL PROFESSION AFTER THE 
2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE 2011 TŌHOKU 
EARTHQUAKE 
Bruce E. Aronson† 
Abstract: In the United States, the 2008 financial crisis had a serious impact on a 
legal profession that had been growing strongly for three decades, highlighting 
fundamental issues concerning the business and educational models of both law firms and 
law schools.  This raises the interesting question of how Japan, with its much shorter 
history of large law firms and professional law schools, has been affected by the 2008 
financial crisis and the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear reactor crisis. 
At a recent conference sponsored by the University of Washington School of Law 
and the law firm of Perkins Coie, a distinguished group of legal practitioners from the 
leading Japanese and foreign law firms in Tokyo engaged in a panel discussion on the 
current state of Japan’s legal profession.  The panelists saw both the 2008 financial crisis 
and the Tōhoku earthquake as “one-time” events that will not have a significant long-
term impact.  The 2008 financial crisis, although it had a lesser economic impact in Japan, 
raised fundamental issues similar to those in the United States concerning the appropriate 
models for large law firms and law schools.  Despite a number of current problems, the 
panelists supported the goals and direction of recent Japanese reforms, which have 
overhauled the system of legal education and increased the number of lawyers, and they 
explicitly embraced a new model for the legal profession:  rather than the traditional 
small elite with a narrow societal role, the Japanese bar would be significantly expanded 
and compete to fill a wide range of law-related roles in society. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
During the period from 2000 to 2007 observers of the Japanese legal 
profession grew accustomed to a new world in which lawyers and law firms 
played an increasingly important role in Japan.  The changes during this time 
included 1) the rise of large corporate law firms, 2) an increase in both the 
demand for corporate legal services and the supply of lawyers, 3) an 
expansion in the range of work activities of big firm lawyers and their 
increasing influence with Japanese businesses and government, 4) mergers 
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among both domestic and international law firms, and 5) a greater presence 
by foreign law firms in Tokyo.1 
These changes in the legal profession contradicted a long-standing 
image of Japan as a place where law and lawyers were of little importance.  
In addition, this period saw the introduction of even more ambitious legal 
reform.  Following a broad plan adopted in 2001 (see infra Appendix D),2 a 
new graduate law school system was introduced in 2004;3 plans were made 
for the continuing expansion of the supply of lawyers, with a corresponding 
expansion of their role as “doctors for the people’s social lives”;4 a new jury 
(or “lay judge”) system was instituted for serious criminal cases;5 foreign 
law firms were allowed to form partnerships with Japanese firms and hire 
                                                      
1
  The extent and significance of these changes were explored in a prior panel discussion of Japanese 
lawyers held in 2007.  See Bruce E. Aronson, The Brave New World of Lawyers in Japan: Proceedings of a 
Panel Discussion on the Growth of Corporate Law Firms and the Role of Lawyers in Japan, 21 COLUM. J. 
ASIAN L. 45 (2007).  That article concluded that the positive aspects of an increasingly important role and 
new opportunities for Japanese lawyers were achieved at the cost of new competitive pressures and 
tradeoffs that are familiar to American lawyers, and that the prior insular and secure “beautiful world” of 
Japanese lawyers cited by one panelist might be giving way to a competitive “brave new world” for 
lawyers in Japan.  Id. at 82. 
2
  The Japanese Cabinet created a special legal reform council in 1999, which issued its final report 
in 2001.  For an English translation of the final report, see JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, 
RECOMMENDATIONS (2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/judiciary/2001/0612report.html.  
Among the report’s many recommendations were a series of targets for increasing both bar passage rates 
and increasing the overall number of lawyers.  For an overview of the legal reform process, see, for 
example, Kahei Rokumoto, Overhauling the Judicial System: Japan’s Response to the Globalizing World, 
20 J. JAPAN. L. 7 (2005). 
3
  See generally Setsuo Miyazawa, Education and Training of Lawyers in Japan – A Critical 
Analysis, 43 S. TEX. L. REV. 491, 493-95 (2002); James R. Maxeiner & Keiichi Yamanaka, The New 
Japanese Law Schools: Putting the Professional into Legal Education, 13 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 303, 313 
(2004).  See also Koichiro Fujikura, Reform of Legal Education in Japan: The The Creation of Law 
Schools Without a Professional Sense of Mission, 75 TUL. L. REV. 941, 945 (2001) (emphasizing the 
shortcomings of Japan’s new law schools); Mark D. West, Making Lawyers (and Gangsters) in Japan, 60 
VAND. L. REV. 439 (2007). 
4
  This is the goal quoted in the reform council’s report.  See JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, 
supra note 2, ch. III, pt. 1-1. 
5
  Saiban’in no sanka suru keiji Saiban ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Concerning Participation of Lay 
Assessors in Criminal Trials], Law No. 63 of 2004, translated in Kent Anderson & Emma Saint, Japan’s 
Quasi Jury (Saiban-in) Law: An Annotated Translation of the Act Concerning Participation of Lay 
Assessors in Criminal Trials, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 9, 9 (2005).  Under the lay-judge system, mixed 
tribunals of professional judges and members of the public are called to render verdicts and determine 
sentences in serious criminal cases.  There are varying conceptions of the role of the lay-judge system in 
Japanese society; some view it as an important step towards reforming a criminal justice system that is 
substantially unfair to criminal defendants, others as a means of educating the public about the legal system 
and of promoting civic engagement.  For general discussion of the lay-judge system, see, for example, 
Matthew J. Wilson, Japan’s New Criminal Jury Trial System: In Need of More Transparency, More Access, 
and More Time, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 487 (2010).  For a comparison of the lay-judge system and the 
American jury system, see Daniel Senger, The Japanese Quasi-Jury and the American Jury: A 
Comparative Assessment of Juror Questioning and Sentencing Procedures and Cultural Elements in Lay 
Judicial Participation, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 741 (2011). 
MARCH 2012 LAWYERS IN JAPAN REVISITED 257 
Japanese attorneys; 6  and numerous other measures were undertaken to 
implement this vision (see infra Appendix E). 
In the United States, the 2008 financial crisis had a serious impact on 
a legal profession that had been growing strongly for three decades.  For the 
first time large firms laid off attorneys for clearly stated economic reasons 
rather than due to performance, and their long-standing business models 
were called into question.7  American law schools, which had also enjoyed 
decades of continuous growth, faced their own challenge to their business 
and educational models.8  With increasing student loan burdens and a tough 
job market, the question frequently arose whether law school was now a 
“bad deal” for law students.9 
This raised the interesting question of how Japan, with its much 
shorter history of large law firms and professional law schools, has been 
affected by the 2008 financial crisis, or “Lehman shock.”10  Has the demand 
for legal services dried up?  Have Japanese law firms also had layoffs?  Is 
the number of lawyers still expanding?  Have attitudes toward the activities 
of foreign law firms changed?  Are recent reforms in the legal profession and 
legal education over the past decade continuing, or is there retrenchment due 
to poor economic conditions?  In addition, what is the effect of the 2011 
Tōhoku earthquake and nuclear reactor crisis?  
The theme of a recent panel discussion by prominent attorneys from 
Japan was that the Japanese legal profession demonstrated considerable 
resiliency in the face of these challenges.  The panelists shared a basic 
optimism that Japan’s legal profession still has a bright future, and will 
adjust to the current short-term issues as necessary.  However, as in the 
                                                      
6
  See Gaikoku bengoshi ni yoru hōritsu jimu no toriatsukai ni kan suru tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on 
Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Legal Services by Foreign Lawyers], Law No. 66 of 1986.  
Subsequent major amendments became effective on January 1, 1995 and April 1, 2005.  The number of 
registered foreign law attorneys has grown dramatically from 87 in April of 1998 to 344 in April of 2010.  
JAPAN FEDERATION FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, WHITE PAPER ON ATTORNEYS 11 (2010), 
available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/en/about/data/WhitePaper2010 [hereinafter 2010 WHITE 
PAPER].  As of April 1, 2010, 34 foreign law joint enterprises, employing a total of 627 Japanese attorneys 
and 55 foreign law attorneys, have submitted notifications to the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
(as required by the 2005 amendment).  Id. at 13.  For additional data, see infra Appendix B. 
7
  See William D. Henderson & Rachel M. Zahorsky, Paradigm Shift, A.B.A. J., July 2011, at 40 
(arguing that a “massive structural shift” of the balance of power in the provision of legal services from 
traditional law firms to clients and new “tech-savvy” legal service providers began prior to, and was 
significantly exacerbated by, the 2008 financial crisis, and that the business model of big law firms has 
permanently changed); A Less Gilded Future, ECONOMIST, May 7, 2011, at 74.   
8
  See, e.g., Daniel Thies, Rethinking Legal Education in Hard Times: The Recession, Practical 
Legal Education, and the New Job Market, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 598 (2010).  
9
  See, e.g., David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011. 
10
  Outside the U.S., the 2008 financial crisis is commonly referred to by this name.  The Lehman 
Shock, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 13, 2009, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2009/09/14/the-
lehman-shock.html. 
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United States, the 2008 financial crisis sparked widespread discussion of 
fundamental issues concerning the relationships among the legal profession, 
the legal education system, and society. 
The panel discussion covered three principal areas:  the fall in demand 
for legal services following the 2008 financial crisis and law firms’ 
responses to it; legal education and the supply of lawyers; and the effect of 
the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and its aftermath.  The panelists viewed both 
the 2008 financial crisis and the Tōhoku earthquake as “one-time” events 
that would not affect the long-term health of the legal profession in Japan. 
The 2008 financial crisis affected the demand for legal services in 
Japan, but to a lesser extent than in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.  Large Japanese corporate law firms continued to grow (see infra 
Appendix A).  One panelist from a large firm estimated that his firm’s 
annual rate of revenue growth slowed from twenty percent prior to the 
financial crisis to five percent following it, but did not turn negative as was 
the case for many U.S. and U.K. firms. 
The suggested reasons for this difference in impact included the 
smaller size of Japanese law firms; the prior, ongoing restructuring efforts of 
Japanese corporations in the face of an extended period of low economic 
growth; and continuing trends related to the growing importance of lawyers 
in Japanese society.  Within Japan, smaller law firms were even less affected 
than large firms due to their size and relative insulation from the downturn in 
cross-border transactions that occurred as foreign investors reduced their 
activities in Japan. 
The panelists noted that even with a lesser financial impact than that 
suffered by U.S. and U.K. firms, large Japanese law firms nevertheless had a 
temporary surplus of lawyers that necessitated more active management.  
Unlike in the United States and the United Kingdom, there were no 
announced layoffs or direct firing of attorneys in Japan.11  Large Japanese 
                                                      
11
  There was, however, a significant reduction in hiring over time.  For example, Nishimura & Asahi 
hired 46 new associates in January of 2010 and 32 new associates in January of 2011.  Topics: News 
Details: 46 new associates join Nishimura & Asahi on January 6, NISHIMURA & ASAHI, 
http://www.jurists.co.jp/en/topics/others_8248.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012); Topics: News Details: 32 
new associates join Nishimura & Asahi on January 6, NISHIMURA & ASAHI, 
http://www.jurists.co.jp/en/topics/others_9828.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).  This number continued to 
decline to 17 in 2012.  Topics: News Details: 17 new associates join Nishimura & Asahi on January 6, 
NISHIMURA & ASAHI, http://www.jurists.co.jp/en/topics/others_11564.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2012).  
This is counter to an earlier trend of larger incoming classes established in the years prior to the Financial 
Crisis of 2008 in which a typical incoming class of new attorneys at a major corporate law firm was 
somewhere in the twenties or thirties.  See, e.g., Bruce E. Aronson, Changes in the Role of Lawyers and 
Corporate Governance in Japan – How Do We Measure Whether Legal Reform Leads to Real Change?, 
8 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 223, 230 (2009); Zadankai: Daikibo hōritsu jimusho no gendai to 
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law firms instead undertook closer monitoring of associates’ performance 
and assumed a larger role in career counseling in light of the diminished 
opportunities for advancement within firms. 
There was some disagreement among the panelists as to whether this 
truly represented a “kinder, gentler” approach to managing associates that 
was significantly different from the methods commonly used by U.S. and 
U.K. firms.  Representatives of large Japanese firms viewed their efforts as a 
form of career guidance and counseling, but the Tokyo head of a prominent 
English firm did not see a substantial difference in result between Japanese 
practices and outright layoffs.  He noted that the small lateral attorney 
market in Tokyo was flooded with young Japanese lawyers who had been 
pressured to leave large firms and that the end result was similar to the more 
direct layoffs generally associated with personnel practices at English and 
American firms. 
Panelists’ comments also raised the issue whether big firm practices 
that resulted from the 2008 financial crisis, such as more aggressive 
management of associates, could become permanent features of corporate 
law firms.  It is argued in the United States that the financial crisis and other 
factors may have changed the business model of big law firms, 12  and 
Japanese firms also face new concerns about cost control and lawyer quality. 
The most controversial topic in the Japanese legal profession13 today 
is the question of legal education and the supply of lawyers.  The 
far-reaching reform program formulated in 2001 called for a significant 
increase in the number of newly admitted attorneys each year and a doubling 
of the lawyer population by 2018. 14   The program was intended to 
simultaneously improve the quality of new attorneys through a new system 
of graduate-level professional law schools15  (accompanied by a new bar 
exam) that would go far beyond the traditional undergraduate law 
departments in providing both a broader-based and more professional legal 
education. 
                                                                                                                                                              
shōrai [Roundtable: The Present and Future of Large-Scale Law Firms] 57 JIYŪ TO SEIGI 12, 39 (May 2006) 
(remarks of Akira Kosugi). 
12
  See Henderson & Zahorsky, supra note 7. 
13
  Although it was beyond the scope of the panel discussion, it should be noted that Korea has 
undertaken a similar fundamental reform of its legal educational system following legislation enacted in 
2007.  See, e.g., Yeong-Cheol K. Jeong, Korean Legal Education for the Age of Professionalism: 
Suggestions for More Concerted Curricula (working paper, July 2009), available at 
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=young_cheol_jeong&sei-redir=1#sear
ch= Korea legal education reform.  For background on the parallel reform processes in Japan and Korea, 
see Tom Ginsburg, Transforming Legal Education in Japan and Korea, 22 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 433 
(2004). 
14
  See JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 2. 
15
  See supra note 3. 
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Over the past decade, there have been substantial increases in the 
number of new lawyers per year (from roughly 1,000 to 2,100) and in the 
total number of lawyers (from approximately 17,000 to 29,000), although 
both measures remain well below the ambitious reform goals of 3,000 new 
lawyers per year and a total of 50,000 lawyers in 2018 (see infra Appendix 
E).  There are now many stories, supported by data, about new lawyers who 
are unable to find jobs.   
The new law schools also encountered problems.  The original idea 
was to attract a broader range of law school students, in particular those with 
no previous study of law, by raising the number of new attorneys each year 
and achieving a significantly higher bar passage rate (originally envisioned 
to be in the range of 70%, in contrast to 2 to 3% under the old system).  
However, due to a large number of law schools and law students the bar 
passage rate has been much lower than anticipated (27.6% in 2009; see infra 
Appendix C).16  This has discouraged potential law students with non-legal 
backgrounds from applying to law school, and has encouraged law school 
students to focus their studies narrowly on bar exam courses and topics 
rather than pursuing a broad-based legal education.17  The Japanese bar, as 
represented by the Japan Federation of Bar Associations [Nihon Bengoshi 
Rengōkai] (“Nichibenren” or “JFBA”), which initially supported both the 
increase in the supply of lawyers and the new law school system, has 
suffered internal turmoil over these issues18 and has recently called for a 
                                                      
16
  The actual bar passage rate for the first law school graduating class under the new system in 2006 
was 48.3% and, as noted in the text, this percentage has fallen to 27.6% in 2009.  See infra Appendix C.  
The percentage is expected to stabilize in the area of 24%.  See Setsuo Miyazawa & Tatsuya Yonetani, 
Nyūgaku teiin no ichiritsu 3 wari sakugen to 3,000 nin gōkaku no dōji katsu sassokuna jisshi wo—
shimurēshon ni yoru kinkyū teigen [For the Simultaneous and Rapid Implementation of an Across-the 
Board 30% Reduction in the Number of Entering Students and 3,000 Bar Passers—an Emergency 
Recommendation According to Our Simulation], 628 HŌGAKU SEMINĀ 60 (Apr. 2007).  The declining pass 
rate is a result primarily of law school students being divided into two groups with a two-year law school 
course for undergraduates with law majors and a three-year course for non-law undergraduates.  Id.  As the 
non-law undergraduate majors completed the three-year law school course and began taking the bar, there 
was an increase in the total number of bar exam takers. 
17
  Prior to the implementation of graduate law schools, fierce competition resulting from extremely 
low bar passage rates created a phenomenon known as daigakubanare, “the tendency to ignore university 
classes and focus only on preparatory schools.”  JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL, supra note 2, at ch. 
III, pt. 2-1.  Reformers believed that because conventional legal education was “not . . . sufficient in terms 
of . . . specialized legal education,” and because curriculum at preparatory schools was solely focused on 
the bar, the quality of attorneys was seriously impacted.”  Id.  While graduate law schools were seen as a 
means of facilitating more broad-based and practical training for attorneys, falling bar passage rates have 
encouraged, if not forced, law schools to assume the role once filled by preparatory schools. 
18
  In March of 2010, for the first time in the history of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
(“JFBA”), an outside insurgent, Kenji Utsunomiya, was elected president over the incumbent Vice 
President, Takeji Yamamoto.  The key issue that attracted support for the challenger was reportedly a 
pledge to work for a more drastic reduction in the annual number of new lawyers (to 1,500) than promised 
by the incumbent vice president.  See Setsuko Kamiya, Reformist Bar Head Works to Raise Way Lawyers 
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reduction in the annual number of new attorneys19 and reform of the law 
school system. 20  
The panelists, while recognizing shortcomings in the recent reforms, 
were surprisingly uniform in their support for the goals of reform and the 
necessity of continuing to progress toward those goals.  They largely 
attributed the problems of the new law schools to design flaws and political 
compromises in the original plan for law schools and to continuing 
bureaucratic infighting among the government agencies responsible for 
education and for the legal profession.  There was also a consensus that the 
rate of growth in the number of lawyers should not be diminished but rather 
should continue to increase.21 
Rather than debating the appropriate number of new lawyers, the 
panelists regarded the real issue as one of expanding the role of lawyers to 
address the actual and potential demand for legal services by corporations 
                                                                                                                                                              
Serve, JAPAN TIMES, July 24, 2010.  For a recent critical look at the postwar history of the JFBA, see 
generally MASAHIRO KOBAYASHI, KONNA NICHIBENREN NI DARE GA SHITA? [WHO MADE IT THIS KIND OF 
JFBA?] (2010). 
19
  The JFBA maintains that questions about the efficacy of the graduate law school system and 
increases in the number of unemployed lawyers indicate that the growth of the population of lawyers was 
too drastic and sudden.  To address these “institutional distortions” it urges that the “number of successful 
bar examination candidates [be reduced] to a significant extent from the current level.”  JAPAN FED’N OF 
BAR ASS’NS, HOUSOU JINKOU SEISAKU NI KANSURU KINKYŪTEIGEN [URGENT RECOMMENDATIONS ON 
POLICIES FOR THE NUMBER OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS] (Mar. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/activity/document/opinion/year/2011/110327.html, translated at http://www.
nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/opinionpapers/20110327_2.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012). 
20
  The JFBA made a number of recommendations to address failings of the legal education system, 
including re-examining the preliminary exam so that it does not undermine the philosophical basis for the 
law school system; temporarily increasing the number of times a student can take the bar exam from three 
to five times; and reducing the number of law school students by abolishing or merging schools.  JAPAN 
FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, HŌSŌYŌSEI TEIDO NO KAIGEN HŌSAKU NI KANSURU KINKYŪTEIGEN [URGENT 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON IMPROVEMENT OF THE PROFESSIONAL LEGAL TRAINING AND EDUCATION 
SYSTEM] (Mar. 27, 2011), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/opinion/report/data/110327_
3.pdf (summary available in English at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/opinionpapers/20110327
_1.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2012)). 
The impact on bar passage rates of allowing students to take the bar exam five times is not discussed, 
but it stands to reason that the increased pool of applicants would lead to a further decline in passage rates.  
If this measure were to be implemented alongside the recommendation to lower the numerical limit on 
candidates passing the bar, see supra note 19, the resulting low bar passage rate could potentially 
undermine the graduate law school system. 
21
  How to best achieve these goals remains contentious.  The most recent controversy centers on 
retaining a system for a limited number of law undergraduates to “bypass” graduate law schools and take 
the bar exam upon completion of their undergraduate legal education.  A new form of bypass, the yobi 
examination, was offered for the first time in 2011.  The yobi examination draws attention to the many 
shortcomings of the graduate law school system and has provided a vehicle for renewed debate about the 
direction of legal education reform.  See Takayasu Okushima, Ri’nen ni tachimodori hōsō wo fuyase 
[Return to Ideals, Increase the Number of Lawyers], ASAHI SHINBUN, May 31, 2011, at 15; Junji Annen, 
Shihōshiken no juken shikaku ni suruna [Don’t Make Law School a Requirement for Sitting for the Bar 
Exam], ASAHI SHINBUN, May 31, 2011, at 15.  
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and government on the one hand, and by consumers on the other.22  In 
particular, one panelist noted that it was important to remove sources of 
competition faced by lawyers:  1) the large numbers of undergraduate law 
majors who go to work for business and government directly upon 
graduation, and 2) a variety of quasi-lawyers who undertake examinations 
and receive separate licenses in areas such as tax law and intellectual 
property law that would be serviced by lawyers in the United States.23  In 
addition, a panelist noted that demand for legal services remained weak 
among Japanese consumers.24 
This led to a discussion of perhaps the most fundamental issue 
underlying legal reform—the philosophy behind legal education and the bar 
exam.  The contrast between the American system and the traditional view 
of the bar in Japan is striking.  In the United States, the premise of the bar 
exam is to confirm that lawyers have the minimum knowledge necessary to 
be competent attorneys and to compete broadly, allowing them to fulfill a 
wide range of social roles without regulating their numbers; the former 
system in Japan was intended to pick a small, elite group of highly capable 
lawyers for a narrow range of jobs through very difficult testing and direct 
regulation of their numbers.  The question arose as to which model, if either, 
                                                      
22
  By one measure, the total number of in-house lawyers increased from 64 in 2001 to 242 in 2007.  
Aronson, Changes, supra note 11, at 231.  This number continued to grow to 412 in 2009.  NIHON 
SOSHIKINAI BENGOSHI KYŌKAI [JAPAN IN-HOUSE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION], KIGYŌNAI BENGOSHI NO NINZŪ 
TO SHOZOKU KIGYŌ NI KAN SURU CHŌSA 2009 NEN SHIMOHANKI [SECOND HALF 2009 REPORT ON THE 
NUMBER AND CORPORATE AFFILIATION OF IN-HOUSE LAWYERS] (2009).  For the central government, the 
number of in-house government lawyers increased from 40 in 2004 to 69 in 2006.  Aronson, supra note 11, 
at 231. 
23
  The number of lawyers in Japan, as of March of 2010 was 28,789.  See 2010 WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 6, at 1.  The number of licensed legal specialists (that is, not including undergraduate law majors) is 
far larger than the number of licensed lawyers.  Id. at 22 (showing that the total number of licensed “other 
legal professionals” was 241,171 in 2010, of which 28,789 were attorneys).  For a comparative discussion 
of the various categories of legal professionals in Japan, see, for example, Masanobu Kato, The Role of Law 
and Lawyers in Japan and the United States, 1987 BYU L. REV. 627.  For a recent analysis of how legal 
reforms in Japan have affected the various groups of legal service providers, see KYOKO ISHIDA, ETHICS 
AND REGULATIONS OF LEGAL SERVICE PROVIDERS IN JAPAN: DEREGULATION OR RE-REGULATION?  
REMAINING PROBLEMS AFTER THE JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM 25-46 (2011). 
24
  The broad plan adopted in 2001 envisioned greater consumer access to legal services due to 
increases in both supply and demand, with the first pillar of reform containing planks for improving legal 
aid for civil cases and public defenders for criminal cases.  See sources cited supra note 2; infra Appendix 
D.  However, a panelist noted that the bulk of reform efforts have focused on increasing the supply of legal 
services.  The Japanese Diet did pass a Comprehensive Legal Support Law.  See Sōgō hōritsu shienhō 
[Comprehensive Legal Support Law], Law No. 74 of 2004.  This law created a new Japan Legal Support 
Center, which engages in five areas of activities in order to support access to legal services.  See Rokumoto, 
supra note 2, at 33-35; Implementation of Comprehensive Legal Support by the Japan Legal Support 
Center, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.moj.go.jp/ENGLISH/issues/issues02.html (last visited Aug. 1, 
2011).  However, legal aid efforts trail those of other industrialized countries and consumers’ use of 
lawyers in Japan remains quite limited. 
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accurately describes Japan’s newly emerging system, and which model is 
preferable for the legal profession.  
One panelist noted that the planners of the new law school system 
favored a new philosophy that is broadly similar to that prevailing in the 
United States.  However, this approach represents a significant departure 
from past practice and was neither broadly discussed nor universally 
accepted when the reform program was formulated.   
The panelists, all of whom are highly successful lawyers, embraced 
the new broader, competitive approach that underlies the law school system.  
Several panelists expressly accepted the notion that a law license should be 
like a “driver’s license,” that is, it should result in competition among 
qualified license-holders to fill a wide variety of society’s law-related needs 
rather than creating a small elite with a narrow focus.  However, a panelist 
also expressed the concern that the low bar passage rate under the current 
law school system, combined with uncertain job prospects, might reduce the 
attractiveness of the legal profession and thereby lower the overall quality of 
lawyers. 
Reflecting this viewpoint, another panelist characterized the law 
schools’ recent struggles as a new system experiencing birth pains and 
growing pains.  All the panelists accepted the notion that, despite the current 
difficulties there could be no return to the former “elite” system, even if the 
result was that legal jobs could no longer be “guaranteed” for newly minted 
attorneys. 
The final topic was the effect of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and its 
aftermath on the Japanese legal profession.25  A panelist from an American 
law firm described the considerations behind his firm’s decision to announce 
the temporary closing of its Tokyo office shortly after the earthquake.  
Although this decision was questioned by some in Japan, public 
announcements and actions of the U.S. embassy in Tokyo and other 
institutions encouraged voluntary evacuation from Japan. 26   The actual 
                                                      
25
  Japan was hit by a magnitude 9.0 earthquake on March 11, 2011.  USGS Updates Magnitude of 
Japan’s 2011 Tohoku Earthquake to 9.0, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (Mar. 14, 2011) 
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=2727&from=rss_home (last visited Feb. 6, 2012).  The 
earthquake, and the enormous tidal waves it triggered, devastated northern Japan, killing hundreds and 
doing untold amounts of property damage.  Martin Fackler, Powerful Quake and Tsunami Devastate 
Northern Japan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at A1.  Recovery in the Tōhoku region, most severely affected 
by the quake, has been faster than expected, and some feel that the act of rebuilding has given Japan a new 
sense of direction.  Japan’s Post-Quake Economy: Casting About for a Future, ECONOMIST, May 19, 2011, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18713566. 
26
  Beginning on March 13, 2011, the United States embassy in Tokyo began issuing a series of travel 
alerts.  On March 16, the embassy announced authorization for the voluntary evacuation of family members 
of U.S. government personnel and stated that such persons should “consider departing” from Japan.  See 
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decision on evacuation was left to individual attorneys, however, many of 
whom remained and continued to work in Tokyo.  The impact of the 
earthquake on the activities of foreign law firms in Tokyo was expected to 
be temporary.27   
Another panelist noted that the biggest uncertainty was the continuing 
concerns over nuclear reactors in Fukushima.28  This had an impact on law 
firm activities, but was not expected to have a long-term effect.  The same 
panelist expressed the belief that reconstruction efforts in the Tōhoku region 
could help stimulate the Japanese economy and the hope that recent events 
might also create a more “can-do,” positive mindset both domestically and 
with respect to trade and investment throughout Asia. 
Finally, panelists noted the criticism within Japan of the government’s 
regulation of the nuclear power industry and the vulnerable position of the 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (“Tepco”), the operator of the affected 
nuclear reactors.  Questions remain about lawsuits and potential liability, 
criteria for the operations of other nuclear plants and of any new plants, and, 
more generally, about public information and discussion concerning the 
safety and operations of nuclear plants.29 
All of these topics—both short-term impacts and long-term 
fundamental issues—were covered as the panelists discussed the Japanese 
                                                                                                                                                              
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES, TOKYO, JAPAN, TRAVEL WARNING - JAPAN (Mar. 19, 2012), available at 
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/acs/tacs-20110319-travel-warning.html.  
27
  For a survey of a number of large law firms in Tokyo by Japan’s leading business daily, see Hōmu 
juyō, gaishikei jimusho ni ankeeto—“shinsai de genshō” wa ichijiteki—chūchōki de wa kakudai kitai no 
koe [Demand for Legal Services, A Survey of Foreign Law Firms—“Reduction Due to Earthquake” Is 
Temporary—A Voice for Anticipation of Expansion for the Medium-Long Term], NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, 
June 20, 2011. 
28
  The 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and related tidal waves badly damaged a number of nuclear reactors 
in Fukushima.  In order to protect public health, the areas around the reactors were evacuated, and produce 
from the region was banned.  Efforts to bring the reactors under control and to mitigate the effects of the 
radiation released by the damaged reactors have been ongoing.  See generally, Japan’s Catastrophes: 
Nature Strikes Back, ECONOMIST, Mar. 17, 2011, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18398748?s
tory_id=18398748; Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Sees Signs of 2 More Meltdowns, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2011, at 
A10. 
29
  As a result of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, there has been a move for stricter oversight of 
nuclear power.  Within a few months, representatives from around thirty countries met in Paris to discuss 
the future of nuclear power.  Matthew Saltmarsh, Wide Support for Stricter Nuclear Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 8, 2011, at B3.  As a result of what are sure to be enormous damages (some estimates place the 
number at approximately five to ten trillion yen), Tepco’s future is uncertain, though nationalization is seen 
as one possibility.  Taiga Uranaka, TSE head recommends court-led Tepco restructuring, stock dives, 
REUTERS (June 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/07/us-tecpo-idUSTRE75509I20110607; 
Hiroko Tabuchi, After Nuclear Crisis, Japan’s Biggest Utility Faces Insolvency Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 
2011, at B3.  However, the Diet is currently considering a bill that would shift some of the burden of 
compensation to the Japanese government in an attempt to prevent the company from collapsing.  Hideyuki 
Ioka & Chiaki Toyoda, Compensation Bill Aims to Help TEPCO Pay Victims, DAILY YOMIURI ONLINE 
(June 16, 2011), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110615005625.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
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legal profession following the 2008 financial crisis and the Tōhoku 
earthquake. 
II. PROCEEDINGS OF THE PANEL, MAY 9, 2011 
MODERATOR: 
Bruce Aronson 
 
PANELISTS:  
Hisashi Hara, Chairman, Nagashima Ohno & Tsunematsu 
Toru Ishiguro, Partner, Mori Hamada Matsumoto 
Akira Kosugi, Partner, Nishimura & Asahi 
John Roebuck, Partner, Tokyo Office, Jones Day 
Shinichi Sugiyama, Harago & Partners 
Toshiro Ueyanagi, Tokyo Surugadai Law Offices  
Akihiro Wani, Managing Partner, Tokyo Office, Linklaters 
A. Fall in Demand for Legal Services and Law Firms’ Responses 
1. Fall in Demand for Legal Services 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  Following the 2008 financial crisis, external shocks 
and the poor economy must have affected the demand for legal services.  
How would you generally describe the effect? 
 
MR. HARA:  As a general matter, before 1995 the role of Japanese lawyers 
was largely limited to cross-border transactions and litigation.  Japanese 
companies did not use lawyers for domestic transactions.  Starting around 
1995, Japanese companies started using lawyers for their domestic 
transactions, and that changed the demand for lawyers very drastically.  
From 1995 until the Lehman shock, the major Japanese law firms probably 
recorded more than a twenty percent increase in their revenue every year.  
As a result of the Lehman shock, U.S. and U.K. law firms suffered a 
decrease in revenues and they initiated very substantial cost reductions, 
including layoffs of lawyers and staff members, to maintain their profit per 
partner.  The affected lawyers sometimes included partners.  But that was not 
the situation in Japan. 
We were also strongly affected by the Lehman shock; however, we 
could still maintain an increase in revenue at a lower level.  At my firm, in 
2009, we only had around a five percent increase in revenue compared to the 
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twenty percent increase before the Lehman shock.  So the situation was not 
terribly bad compared to U.S. or U.K. law firms, partially because we do not 
have as many lawyers.  So we still enjoy a good balance from the viewpoint 
of lawyers’ supply and demand.  Another factor is that the Japanese 
economy suffered badly in the early 1990s after the economic bubble burst.  
Japanese companies had adjusted and were relatively prepared to overcome 
the situation at the time of the Lehman shock.  As a result, demand in the 
Japanese legal market decreased, but not to the same extent as in the U.S. 
and UK. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  What areas of your practice have been affected the 
most, and what areas have been affected the least?  Is there any difference 
between manufacturing and financial services?  Has there been an increase 
in countercyclical work such as litigation and bankruptcy since the financial 
crisis? 
 
MR. HARA:  There are many differences among practice areas.  For example, 
the capital markets practice was almost dead after the Lehman shock. 
Among transactions, the U.S. and U.K. markets suffered in the [mergers and 
acquisitions (“M&A”)] area, and Japan did as well.  Inbound cross-border 
M&A transactions, mainly from major U.S. funds coming to Japan to 
acquire Japanese companies, was very slow or dead.  But on the other hand, 
Japanese companies engaged in strategic M&A transactions so that volume 
was maintained.  Also, the insolvency practice performed better. 
  
MR. ISHIGURO:  The areas which were adversely affected at our law firm 
include structured finance, or the securitization field, and also private equity 
and other fund-related activities.  M&A remained relatively healthy due to 
the strategic M&A activities of domestic companies, although financial 
M&A activities were very slow.  
Litigation remained largely unaffected by the financial crisis. The 
general situation in the capital markets was not good, but due to the crisis 
many large Japanese financial institutions and corporations felt the need to 
strengthen their balance sheets and entered into large fund-raising 
transactions including global offerings of equities.  The overall number of 
transactions in the capital markets field decreased drastically, but the total 
size of the offerings increased dramatically.  The field of insolvency was 
better off.  This is a general overview of our firm after the financial crisis in 
2008. 
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PROFESSOR ARONSON:  What about the effect of the 2008 financial crisis on 
foreign law firms in Japan?  
 
MR. WANI:  The Lehman shock seriously affected international firms which 
have global operations, and our firm is mainly focused on cross-border 
work.  As Mr. Hara mentioned, domestic M&A was stable, but the 
motivation for non-Japanese companies to make investments in Japan was 
severely affected and that market was almost dead.  On the other hand, the 
motivation of Japanese corporations to engage in overseas M&A activities 
strengthened.  Outbound M&A transactions sound like good deals for 
lawyers in Tokyo, but in reality such lawyers just play the role of 
intermediaries and send the cases to law firms overseas.  So the situation in 
Japan continues to be difficult with regard to international transactions.  
Japanese still have a great amount of money to invest, but people favor 
simple products.  Because of that tendency, transactions continue but they 
require less advice from lawyers.  Japan has special problems with the recent 
earthquake and nuclear reactor crisis, but even after taking such facts into 
consideration, Japan is still a bit behind in the demand for legal services 
compared to other economies.  However, I think that we may catch up 
sometime in the latter half of this year. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  Is there any difference in impact between the large 
corporate firms and smaller law firms?   
 
MR. UEYANAGI:  The impact was less because our firm is smaller than those 
of other panelists.  However, I think smaller firms also suffered from a 
decrease in the number of matters, especially those related to real estate 
transactions, since the value of real estate is decreasing.  I am trying to think 
of new practice areas.  For example, some Japanese consumers and small 
enterprises are suffering losses in transactions involving derivative financial 
products with major banks.  Another potential field is employment law.  Due 
to M&A transactions and the restructuring of Japanese small and medium-
sized enterprises, more people are losing their jobs and so the number of 
employment cases is also increasing.  However, these cases are somewhat 
time-consuming and less profitable. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  Have clients become more concerned with the costs 
of using lawyers?  Is there any greater competition among law firms for 
clients? 
 
268 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 21 NO. 2 
 
MR. KOSUGI:  The expansion of Japanese corporate law firms was caused by 
social changes in Japan over the past two decades.  The Western-style legal 
system permeates Japanese society, and Western-style lawyering was 
adopted by Japanese law firms starting in the late 1990s.  At that time, 
foreign investors were interested in bargain deals in Japan because of the 
economic crisis.  Such complex deals require more corporate lawyers to 
conduct legal due diligence and to handle those transactions. 
These trends contributed to our firm growing very fast.  When I 
became managing partner fifteen years ago, the number of lawyers at our 
firm was around forty.  Now we have almost five hundred lawyers.  As a 
result, events in 2008 outside of Japan in the United States or Europe, such 
as the Lehman shock, affected us as well. 
Returning to your question on cost consciousness, it is an issue 
because many of our clients are foreign financial institutions and also some 
are top-tier Japanese business institutions that are competing globally.  
Therefore, if something happens to lawyers in the United States or Europe, it 
will also likely have some effect on us.  Now even the top-tier U.S. firms or 
[the five top-earning U.K.] “Magic Circle” firms are not immune from 
pressure from their clients to discount rates.  That would have been 
inconceivable ten years ago.  It is not unusual that many foreign investors 
are more cost conscious and that as a result, Japanese financial institutions 
also learned how to deal with lawyers.  Some clients are now quite cost 
conscious, although it is not as direct for Japanese law firms as for foreign 
law firms.  We are no longer neglecting the demand for cost control from 
clients.  We must demonstrate that our services are of a quality that warrants 
our fees.  In that sense, I think that the cost element has changed and it will 
never return to the old days. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  So you have lost your immunity from cost 
considerations.  Have smaller firms been able to steal some of these 
sophisticated clients away from larger firms? 
 
MR. SUGIYAMA:  I am a partner in a smaller firm with twenty lawyers.  From 
the late 1990s, there were many cases of securitized loans and invested 
assets in which the investors were mostly foreign investors from the U.S.A., 
U.K., or other countries.  And this trend still continued even after the 
Lehman shock, but it is slowing down.  Some investor deals went away, but 
other investors came into the market and the total number of matters is 
almost the same after the crisis.  Cost consciousness is also almost the same.  
We always had a modest fee since we have a smaller number of lawyers and 
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staff and a smaller office than other firms, and our practice is not as 
expensive to maintain.  Dealing with assets in Japan does not require a large 
number of lawyers and staff, so cost performance is very important for 
clients.  After the Lehman, shock I heard that some larger firms tried to get 
involved in litigation over assets in Japan, but it seems not to have worked 
because they do not have our breadth of experience in this area and the cost 
is higher than for smaller law firms. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  Do you view the fall in demand as something that is 
cyclical and will recover over time, or is there a danger of a permanent loss 
of demand for legal services? 
 
MR. ROEBUCK:  It is a big question so I will give a big answer.  I view this 
decrease in demand, if any, as what might be called transitory rather than 
permanent.  It is not cyclical because I thought Lehman was a one-off event 
and certainly one hopes that the events of March [the Tōhoku earthquake 
and its aftermath] were also a one-off event.  I take a rather bullish view of 
the prospects for continued demand for corporate work in Japan for a 
number of reasons.  I think the drivers of legal demand are fundamentally 
economic growth, corporate investment and profitability, complexity of the 
legal environment, and, of course, how corporations use lawyers.  And I 
think all of those trends are still pointing in a largely positive direction.  
Although there are some caveats, as we have already heard, such as a greater 
cost consciousness, I do expect that what we will see will not be a collapse 
in demand or net reduction in demand, but rather a change in the 
composition of demand. 
My speculation is that because of a heightened perception of risk in 
Japan there may be less inbound acquisitions and foreign direct investment 
[(“FDI”)], perhaps counterbalanced by more alliances and joint ventures as 
foreign investors continue to seek greater access into Japan.  There may also 
be more strategic outbound FDI and acquisitions, principally by smaller 
Japanese corporations that have not already successfully moved offshore, as 
they realize and respond to a heightened perception of Japan risk by 
Japanese corporations.  I think there may be some knock-on increase in 
demand from the reactions of various corporate players to a heightened 
perception of Tokyo risk due to over-concentration in Tokyo.  So I think this 
process will be more a change in demand rather than a gross deflation of it.  
We have been through this before, after Lehman.  We have already 
heard from other panelists that there was less real estate, less securitizations, 
and less capital market activities, balanced by more bankruptcy and 
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insolvency disputes, investigations, anti-trust, and some M&A.  We heard 
that at least through 2010, the law firms continued to grow, and that was true 
in our case as well.  We grew from forty to about sixty lawyers from 2007 to 
2010.  And I should also add that even though we are a foreign firm, we are 
largely Japanese in our makeup.  When I joined sixteen years ago, we had 
two lawyers in Tokyo, and we now have sixty.  So I am, in conclusion, an 
optimist concerning a continuing robust increase in demand, at least in the 
short to medium term.  In the long run, one has to wonder how the various 
structural issues that are present in Japan may play out, but I will leave that 
to later generations. 
2. Law Firms’ Response to the Financial Crisis 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  In the United States many large law firms fired 
attorneys for economic reasons following the financial crisis of 2008. 
Despite the continuing overall growth of the largest Japanese law firms [see 
infra Appendix A], there presumably were also more attorneys than needed 
at large firms in Japan.  However, our image of Japan suggests that there 
would be reluctance to fire attorneys.  Were there any firings?  How did you 
deal with that situation? 
  
MR. ISHIGURO:  Since the effect of the 2008 financial crisis was not as great 
in Japan as in the United States, the U.K., or Europe, management of the 
number of lawyers in large law firms such as ours was also not as affected 
by the crisis as in other areas.  Nevertheless, we felt the need to manage the 
size of the firm and the number of associates because, as Professor Aronson 
noted, of the rapid growth in the size of the firm throughout the last decade.  
There was no direct firing of associates or partners in our firm.  But we felt it 
was necessary to monitor and evaluate associates all through the year to 
gauge their motivation, performance, and ability.  And we are engaged in 
continuing discussions with them about prospects for the future, and that 
will naturally result in encouraging those who do not have good future 
prospects that can be shared with our firm to think about alternative 
professional careers.  Fortunately, in Japan, these alternative careers are 
developing gradually, if slowly.  I think it is an interesting situation in our 
firm, since although there is no direct firing there is managing of the number 
of associates as a whole. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  How have foreign firms been affected?  Despite the 
continuing overall growth of foreign law firms in Tokyo [see infra Appendix 
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B], foreign firms also presumably had a surplus of attorneys and staff.  Did 
you follow more of a “Japanese-style” response or an “American-” or 
“English-style” response in dealing with your attorney and staff population 
following the financial crisis? 
 
MR. WANI:  We had a redundancy plan.  But the problem with the 
international firms in Tokyo is that we are just part of global organizations.  
Once our global management decides to reduce the number of lawyers we 
must also reduce from the viewpoint of fair treatment, even if it results in a 
loss of substantial prior investment.  In Tokyo at that time, we had three 
kinds of lawyers:  English solicitors, U.S. lawyers, and bengoshi [Japanese 
lawyers].  Based on discussions with my friends at New York law firms, 
British firms seem to be quite transparent and strict on such matters, and 
some of my English, American, and Japanese colleagues had to leave.  With 
regard to Japanese lawyers in our Tokyo office, we were told that we should 
reduce the number of bengoshi, too, and we entered into discussions of so-
called voluntary retirement, which means that we need to provide greater 
severance pay than usual. 
We had to talk with our weaker performance people and finally they 
agreed to step down.  It is great news that although we expected many of 
them to have difficulty in finding new positions, they all found new 
positions within two months after their departure, despite the fact that all law 
firms were retrenching and there was a very weak lateral market at that time.  
Mr. Ishiguro noted that the Japanese firms did not do any direct firing.  But 
in fact, there are many people in the lateral market who are looking for new 
positions because of insecurity with their current firm and some of them say 
they were encouraged to leave by their current employer.  So the situation 
seems to be quite similar to what took place in the U.S. or in the U.K. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  Have views changed on the long-term strategy, 
positioning, or ideal size for law firms in Japan as a result of the financial 
crisis? 
I note that at a prior panel discussion four years ago, Nishimura & 
Asahi was in the midst of a big merger.  There was a statement by a panelist 
from Nishimura & Asahi at that time that this represented the first merger in 
Japan that was not undertaken to acquire a specialty practice like capital 
markets, but rather to grow bigger and to add more breadth and depth to 
handle large matters for clients.  Has this strategy been affected at all due to 
recent events?  
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MR. KOSUGI:  I note that I just resigned as managing partner this January and 
so my successor will have a free hand to take measures for coping with the 
new situation, including human resource issues.  I think the basic issue is 
how we deliver value to our clients, and that would be the main driving 
factor of our strategy. 
At the time of the merger in 2007, we retained our so-called 
Nishimura system, but this style may need to be adjusted in the near future 
depending upon the circumstances surrounding us.  At that time there was 
surplus demand for our work and we needed human resources, not only from 
new graduates but also from lawyers who already had enough experience to 
create value for our clients.  That was a major reason that our merger sought 
primarily to enlarge our pool of talent.  And specialty practice areas are 
being enhanced by that as well.  It is not only a matter of quantity, but it also 
relates to the quality of our legal services. 
But the current situation is that we have an increasing number of new 
law school graduates, some four times more than twenty years ago.  So we 
have changed the style of our recruiting by making decisions on the hiring of 
new graduates two years before they enter the market.  In 2008 to 2009, we 
recruited more than fifty new graduates each year.  But the quality of those 
new graduates is still a big question.  Many say that under the old difficult 
bar examination, with a passage rate of something like two percent, we were 
somewhat guaranteed to get good lawyers.  Under the new bar examination 
system, there was supposed to be a passage rate of more than seventy 
percent in the original plan.  But even at the current passage rate of around 
thirty percent, we have a division of opinion amongst our partners whether 
our new hires are the same quality as those we had ten years ago.  If you 
have partners or senior associates who are well trained, you can deliver 
enough value to clients.  You can persuade clients that our services are the 
best services that can be obtained in Japan.  But it may now sometimes be 
difficult to say that about the services of junior associates, and this relates to 
how you form a team to handle cases.  It would be more effective to simply 
take an energetic partner and some talented senior associates who can handle 
big matters quickly and efficiently, and create value for our clients.  But to 
continue as an institution, we need to educate and train young associates on 
the ground.  To do that, we must involve young associates in teams with 
partners and senior associates. 
But under the current circumstances, there are some cases where we 
have difficulty in forming such teams since clients demand more efficient 
services from us.  That means there might be some redundancy of those 
junior associates and we must deal with this.  One way is to reduce the 
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number of new recruits, but we are not sure of their quality until we work 
together with them.  That may take several years, so we have been trying to 
develop some kind of career exit system for our associates.  If we are not 
satisfied with an associate, in Japan we cannot say “you are fired.”  But 
keeping young attorneys who do not fit well in our firm it is not good for the 
associate or for us.  So I think that we need to show such associates that 
there may be a better way for them to pursue their career.  We also are 
reducing the number of new recruits to some extent.  Through this 
combination we must keep a balance among the entire composition of 
attorneys within the firm.  This is not particularly related to the global 
financial crisis, but rather related to the increasing number of lawyers 
coming into the market and also to the needs of our clients and how we 
deliver value to our clients. 
B. Legal Education and the Supply of Lawyers 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  That presents a perfect lead-in for the next topic, 
which is legal education and the supply of lawyers.  Appendix D shows how 
Japan has been engaged in a very broad and far-reaching set of legal reforms 
over the past decade.  Our focus today, which is also the area of greatest 
emphasis in Japan, is Pillar Two—and in particular, the expansion of the 
supply or population of lawyers and the introduction of a new legal 
educational system.  Appendix E shows some of the ambitious goals set in 
2001:  an increase in the number of new bar passers every year from around 
1,000 in 2001 to 3,000 by 2010, and an increase in the total number of 
lawyers from roughly 17,000 in 2001 to 50,000 by 2018.  There have been 
significant increases in the number of lawyers over the past decade, but the 
numbers still fall far short of the announced goals.  At the same time, we 
hear stories about new lawyers who cannot find work.  Was the plan to 
increase the number of new lawyers too ambitious and mistaken, or is this 
just a temporary problem due to the financial crisis?  
 
MR. UEYANAGI:  I should point out that last year we had 1,800 new lawyers.  
As of December 2010, 214 of them did not register with the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations [(“JFBA”)].  In other words, these 200-plus 
people could not find a legal job as of last December.  One might therefore 
say there are too many lawyers, or at least too many new lawyers.  However, 
yesterday the JFBA announced that as of April 25, [2011,] sixty-four people 
had not registered.  In other words, 150 people have registered with the bar 
in the past four or five months.  They presumably found law firm jobs or 
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chose to establish their own solo practices.  On the other hand, in the Sendai 
area, where they were greatly affected by the earthquake and tsunami, there 
are almost 300 lawyers in the Sendai City Bar Association.  All of the Sendai 
bar members are offering free legal consultation to the affected victims.  To 
provide free legal consultation once a week, they drive one or two hours to 
the seashore.  Even in Iwate, they have eighty lawyers and all of the lawyers 
are volunteering to drive three or four hours to provide legal consultation.  
So it is my observation that Japan needs more lawyers, at least in such rural 
areas. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  New graduate-level professional law schools were 
created in Japan in 2004.  The original idea was to attract a broad range of 
students with different backgrounds and to introduce both U.S.-style 
professional legal education with small classes using the Socratic method 
and a broad-based legal education, not focused on the bar exam, that would 
include new areas such as intellectual property.  Many people seem to feel 
that the law schools have not achieved their goal.  What happened? 
 
MR. HARA:  It is a very difficult question.  The Japanese law school system 
was introduced without careful consideration.  It moved very quickly, and 
one of the basic issues was that the government announced that under the 
new law school system, the bar examination passage rate would be seventy 
percent.  And also under the law school system, law students with an 
undergraduate law background have a two-year program, while those 
without a law background must attend a three-year program.  Many people 
who work at companies might think that if the passage rate is seventy 
percent, it may be worth the challenge.  In the first and second year of the 
new law schools’ operation, many “salarymen” [corporate managers] 
without a legal background entered law school.  But in fact, the first-year 
passing rate was not that high and the actual result was discouraging [see 
infra Appendix C].  As a result, people who work at companies lost interest 
in going to law school and the quality level of students went down.  The plan 
for the law schools was created by the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme 
Court, but actual law school administration is conducted by the Ministry of 
Education[, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology].  The Ministry of 
Education permitted the opening of many law schools, and even at the initial 
stage there were a large total number of enrolled students, with only a fixed 
number who could pass the bar.  As a result, the bar passage rate was not 
near seventy percent.  So it was poor administration or a lack of coordination 
that led to a bad result. 
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This created many problems.  Some law schools have only one or two 
students who pass the bar examination.  And those law schools cannot 
recruit good students and may not survive.  Two years ago the government 
realized that the total number of law school students was too large.  And in 
my view, good law schools like the University of Tokyo should have 
maintained their current number of students and the worst performing law 
schools should disappear.  However, the Ministry of Education announced 
that throughout Japan all law schools should decrease the number of law 
students by ten percent or  twenty percent.  The problem is that the Ministry 
of Education is not an expert about the legal profession but it nevertheless 
controls law school administration, and it sometimes makes serious 
mistakes.  So except for the few excellent law schools, almost all law 
schools are very focused on how many of their students can pass the bar.  
However, they have a low bar passage rate and have trouble attracting 
excellent new students, which creates a vicious circle.  It is also difficult 
now to create creative and challenging classes that are unrelated to the bar 
examination.  So at regional universities it is not easy for a young college 
student to enter law school.  
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  What should be done to fix the law school system? 
 
MR. SUGIYAMA:  As Mr. Hara described, the law schools in Japan are 
controlled or operated by the Ministry of Education, not by the Supreme 
Court or by the Ministry of Justice.  On the other hand, the bar examination 
is controlled by an independent committee for the bar examination which is 
actually controlled by the Ministry of Justice.  So there are conflicts between 
the government agencies.  We left too many matters undecided when we 
actually launched the law school system in Japan.  
The basic issue that we first need to revisit is whether we need to 
change the image or the conception of lawyers in Japan.  The traditional 
image of the bengoshi is that they are the elite with the most difficult 
examination among a number of law-related qualifications in Japan.  Should 
we change this or not?  If the answer is yes, we must do many things, 
including not only the establishment of law schools, but also seriously 
giving consideration to abolishing universities’ undergraduate law 
departments.  Since we continue to have undergraduate law departments in 
addition to law schools, it is a double system.  Many smart students choose 
to seek employment at a Japanese corporation after they complete their 
undergraduate education.  So demand from companies is mostly satisfied by 
the graduates from the undergraduate law departments, not by graduates 
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from law schools.  That is a problem.  And secondly, we must seriously 
discuss whether to have unified qualifications for all law-related professions.  
For example, in Japan we have benrishi [intellectual property law 
professionals], zeirishi [tax law professionals] and other categories that 
would all be lawyers in the United States.  But in Japan each category has its 
own different qualifications and is controlled by a different administrative 
agency.  So we need to seriously discuss abolishing or combining these 
categories.  Unless we can achieve that, the law school system will not work. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  So we need to attack the issue more broadly.  In the 
United States, law schools have faced serious issues over the past few years, 
as the number of students has increased and they have assumed student loans 
and higher debt levels to attend law school, but the job prospects are 
substantially diminished.  This has caused some people to argue that “going 
to law school doesn’t pay” and bright young people should pursue other 
goals.  What is the situation in Japan?  Have law schools been losing 
popularity over the past few years? 
 
MR. KOSUGI:  The general motivation for those who would like to enter law 
school has been weakened by events over the past several years.  The 
passage rate is not what was promised by the government.  If this happened 
in the United States, there would be a large class action suit against the 
government.  That is not the case in Japan.  The design of the law schools 
may be too idealistic to some extent, but I do not think that we can go back 
to the old system, so we need to live with the current situation.  And the 
problem is the level of demand for legal services that exists today.  I think 
that the quickest fix might be to create more plaintiffs’ lawyers so that there 
is more litigation in Japan.  But judges are not lenient or generous in 
granting large damage awards, and that is a hurdle to the plaintiffs’ lawyers 
in Japan.  As Mr. Sugiyama said, once attorneys in Japan were an elite 
profession, but I do not think that will be the case any longer.  So as an 
increasing number of lawyers enter the market, the easiest thing is to grant a 
permit to anyone who can pass the minimum qualifications—like a driver’s 
license. 
The other problem is that the clientele in Japan who were under-
served were low-income individuals and corporations.  Corporate clients 
need sophisticated legal services and low-income individuals need day-to-
day care, but for the latter legal aid is not well-established in Japan.  That is 
a problem since more than ninety percent of Japanese lawyers are either solo 
practitioners or in very small firms of less than ten lawyers.  In fact, the 
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major firms like those of some of the panelists are an extreme minority in 
the bar. 
So how we can deal with this situation?  There is no easy, reasonable 
solution.  Businesses are trying to recruit law school graduates to some 
extent.  But they have their own problems, due to a company career system 
that is focused on internal training within their organizations rather than on 
professional qualifications.  That is another hurdle we need to overcome. 
Probably businesses expect us, the large corporate law firms, to educate and 
train some of the new law school graduates, so that after four or five years of 
experience they are better suited for providing legal services within 
corporate organizations.  Our hope is that the number of lawyers within 
companies will increase, but that depends on the mindset of business 
management with regard to risk and how to cope with it in doing business. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  Mr. Kosugi and Mr. Sugiyama have both touched 
upon a very fundamental issue, the philosophy behind the bar exam and the 
legal education system, and I would like to address it more directly.  In the 
United States, the basic purpose of the bar exam and legal education is to 
certify that people who are going to be lawyers have the minimal level of 
knowledge required to be competent attorneys.  We do not attempt to 
directly regulate or limit their numbers, as they will all presumably compete 
to fill a variety of roles in society.  The comment was made that in Japan, 
lawyers do not fill as many roles.  The traditional approach in Japan has 
been quite the opposite, with a strong focus on limiting the number of 
lawyers to produce a very small elite.  And there are other people with legal 
training, as Mr. Sugiyama mentioned, such as undergraduate law majors who 
will fill other roles that might be filled by lawyers in the United States.  With 
the new law school system and the increase in the supply of lawyers in 
Japan, it seems that to some degree Japan is moving away from its 
traditional model.  But are you prepared to embrace something like the U.S. 
model, where the number of lawyers is no longer regulated and the system 
simply certifies minimal competence, or are you still reluctant to do that?  
How would you describe the Japanese system today, and what kind of 
system do you think it should be in the future? 
 
MR. ISHIGURO:  It is a very good, but difficult, question.  I think the publicly 
announced idea was to secure the minimum competence of lawyers and let 
them meet a variety of societal demands.  However, I am afraid that when 
we introduced the new law school system in Japan, there really was no 
commonly shared philosophy among lawyers or society as a whole.  
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Following the introduction of the new system, the passage rate increased 
compared to the old system, even if it was not as much as initially promised.  
We have many more new entrants into the profession.  But Japanese citizens 
still do not consult lawyers in their daily lives as U.S. citizens do, and they 
do not care much about the legal system.  I think the quality level for new 
attorneys is about the same as under the old system, at least for the top ten 
percent of law school graduates.  But I am fearful that the profession itself 
will lose attractiveness, as the motivation for talented young people to select 
the legal profession as their career will decrease.  This would create a major 
problem for Japanese society.  It is not practically and realistically possible 
for us to return to the old system, so I think we should consider how to make 
the law school system, as well as the lawyering system, attractive to young 
people in Japan. 
 
MR. WANI:  The new Japanese system is quite strict in that if you fail the bar 
exam three times, you cannot take it again unless you re-enter law school—a 
so-called “three strikes and you’re out” system.  To our surprise, at the law 
school where I lecture, we saw graduates who failed the bar three times and 
wish to re-enter law school.  Also, the number of academicians has fallen 
because the Ministry of Education recommended a strange rule that to be a 
law professor, you must graduate from law school and then enter a separate 
graduate program for law.  Quite recently, the University of Tokyo relaxed 
this regulation.  In the past, excellent law professors entered into academic 
life right after university graduation in their early twenties.  But nowadays 
they must wait until the age of twenty-five.  This situation should be 
improved. 
I agree with Mr. Kosugi’s idea that lawyer certification should be like 
a driver’s license.  In the past, I was told by those who passed the bar exam, 
“our life is now like retirement, our future is guaranteed, and there is no 
need to work hard.”  This is no longer the case.  I think that the increase of 
lawyers is necessary, but it is also important to monitor for malpractice and 
to try to keep the quality of professional practice as close to the current level 
as possible.  Although lawyers are professionals, we do not stick to the old 
image of the legal profession.  I think that the American style of lawyers 
could work in Japanese society.  When we introduced the new system, we 
thought that after graduation and the bar exam, there is no need for 
additional training under the control of the Supreme Court at the Legal 
Research and Training Institute.  But the Supreme Court insisted on keeping 
such training, so the current system is duplicative.  The question is what 
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should we do to make legal training efficient and make the market more 
competitive? 
 
MR. ROEBUCK:  Japan may not be unique, but it is certainly among a very 
small number of countries that have effectuated such a deep and dramatic 
reform to legal education and licensing in recent years.  I think it is almost 
unprecedented and revolutionary.  I have been practicing as a lawyer in the 
United States for thirty-six years now, and frankly not much has changed 
there in these areas.  In fact, compared with Japan, the number of lawyers 
produced annually has not changed very much in the United States.  When I 
graduated from law school in 1975, there were some thirty thousand lawyers 
being created annually.  It is now forty to fifty thousand. It has not been such 
a large increase in percentage terms.  Back then, Harvard Law School 
already had classes of over five hundred students.  We have grown a bit, but 
that is pretty much where we are today.   
The U.S. legal profession has enjoyed an incredible run of prosperity 
over that period of time.  The reason is that it was actually the U.S. that was 
limiting the number of lawyers, although not through any legal control.  If 
you look at the results, you will see that in the U.S. the economy grew faster 
than the number of lawyers and certainly corporations and their profitability 
grew faster than the number of lawyers.  There is also globalization and 
other new sources of demand.  I like to poke fun at some of my colleagues in 
law offices in Japan, because I think there is a perception that, in Japan, 
lawyers are a very scarce commodity and in the United States they are a 
dime a dozen.  But the reality is that over the last thirty years, at least highly-
qualified, corporate U.S. lawyers have been very scarce, and it has been a 
very favorable market for them.  That has been true in Japan until now, of 
course.  And Japan has accomplished, to its credit, a thoroughgoing, deep 
reform of legal education and licensing.  I think it was necessary for a 
number of reasons that have been mentioned, and it cannot be reversed.  
However, because it was so deep, and because, at least as articulated 
originally by those who designed it, it was philosophically different than 
what had come before, we are now witnessing significant birth pains and 
growing pains.  I personally think that in the midst of this chaos, the law 
schools have done a reasonably good job.  It is not the law schools that are 
failing or falling down, it is those who designed the system and those who 
administer the system.  They continue to fail.  If there is fault, I believe that 
is where the fault lies. 
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C. Effects of the 2011 Tōhoku Earthquake and its Aftermath 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  In the immediate aftermath of the Tōhoku 
earthquake, a number of foreign law firms evacuated their personnel out of 
Tokyo, including Jones Day.  What was the reasoning behind this action?  
Was there a greater threat perception in law firms’ head offices outside of 
Japan than in Tokyo? 
 
MR. ROEBUCK:  As you know, that was a difficult moment in the lives of 
many people and, of course, it was a difficult situation for our law firm. We 
are the Tokyo office of a global law firm.  Although our attorney population 
is largely Japanese and our staff is nearly entirely Japanese, we have a fairly 
large component of foreign attorneys who are not Japanese nationals.  
Therefore, all of those interest groups have to be taken into account as the 
law firm is managed.  What happened is that a decision was made jointly by 
firm management in the United States and local management of the Tokyo 
office that the office should be closed temporarily in light of a perception of 
risk, both actual and potential, to the health and safety of Tokyo office 
personnel.  It was done in a way that protected everyone, and everyone was 
given the option to relocate to the Kansai area.  Many people in the office 
did relocate, but also many people did not.  Although the office was closed 
temporarily, about half of the people actually stayed in Tokyo and worked in 
the office during this time, and throughout we kept the office going on a 
kind of virtual basis.  That period of temporary closure lasted about seven or 
eight days. 
One may question that decision in retrospect, and there has been some 
criticism in Japan about the behavior of some foreigners and foreign firms.  I 
think that the decision our firm made was based on information that was 
obtainable at the time through the media and also on announcements by 
some governments.  Some of you may know, for example, that the United 
States embassy offered to evacuate all embassy families, although not the 
employees themselves.  A very large percentage of those people did 
evacuate, and my information is that a large number of them remain outside 
of Japan to this day.  I was told a couple of weeks ago, for example, that the 
enrollment in the American elementary school was down about thirty 
percent.  Some of you may know that the U.S. embassy has a website 
providing information about the events, and recommendations and 
suggestions about what to do.  In the early days, that website contained a 
statement that U.S. nationals should consider relocating out of Japan.  Some 
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of you may be aware that some European countries advised all of their 
nationals, wherever they were located, to leave Japan. 
One may question the wisdom or the properness of some of those 
statements, but the fact is they happened.  Our management in the United 
States, which needs to consider among other things, the health and safety of 
personnel, took those statements into account in making its decision.  
Although there will inevitably be a range of reactions and individual 
circumstances and opinions about such matters, that was the decision that 
this law firm made.  But it was done in a balanced and structured way to 
provide equality of treatment and support to all employees—not just foreign 
employees or the attorneys, but to all employees—and in a way that 
protected client interests.  And I think it was generally appreciated by the 
attorneys and the staff, but I will acknowledge that we did receive some 
questions from our clients. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  As some of you may know, the running joke in 
Tokyo was that the Japanese word for foreigner is “gaijin” and that the 
foreigners who fled from danger were “flyjin.”  
How were Japanese law firms affected?  Do you think that this will 
have a short-term impact that will not affect your long-term operations? 
 
MR. HARA:  We must distinguish the nuclear radiation problem from the 
earthquake and tsunami problem.  At this moment, attention is focused on 
the radiation problem rather than on the earthquake and tsunami.  After the 
earthquake, many deals that were near closing were suspended or postponed, 
but not cancelled.  Foreign investors wanted to watch the situation of the 
Japanese market.  Japanese lawyers were operating in Tokyo.  They were not 
worried about radiation as it is sufficiently far away.  We have suffered from 
a shortage in the electricity supply.  In terms of operations, Japanese law 
firms are fine, and none of them moved to Osaka.  However, in terms of 
practice, foreign investment may have suffered, and that may continue until 
some solution or some direction becomes clear for resolving the nuclear 
problem.  I do not think it will be very long, perhaps one year or so.  
In Japan, consumer prices have not changed during the last twenty 
years—except for legal fees—and that means that domestic demand never 
changed.  But in order to reconstruct the affected areas we will need to 
create five or six new cities, and that reconstruction effort will greatly 
stimulate the Japanese domestic market.  So in the long run, that may have a 
positive effect on the Japanese economy.  It may also result in a positive 
mindset, not only in the domestic market, but also in terms of more 
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aggressive investment in Asian countries.  This disaster has been a tragedy, 
however it will also lead to a positive change in the Japanese people’s 
mindset over the mid- or long-term.  For that reason, it may also have a 
beneficial effect on legal practice. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  One issue is the regulatory side.  Just yesterday there 
was a front-page article in the New York Times about how the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission is not really capable of effectively regulating the 
nuclear industry.  Is there a similar discussion in Japan concerning regulation 
of the nuclear industry? 
 
MR. SUGIYAMA:  Yes, we have similar discussions, and some argue that the 
close relationship among electric and oil companies and the ministries is a 
problem.  But in addition to this, it is also discussed that the anti-nuclear 
power movement and local communities’ objections to nuclear plants have 
had the adverse effect of concentrating nuclear reactors and making plants 
more crowded.  Another adverse effect is that the companies and ministries 
avoided serious discussion of, and concrete plans for dealing with, the worst 
case scenario, and instead merely propagated a myth of safety.  All told, it is 
a failure of Japanese society. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  The operator of the nuclear plants, the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company, or Tepco, has also come under severe criticism.  If a client 
asked you about the lessons to be learned from Tepco’s response to the 
crisis, what would you say? 
 
MR. KOSUGI:  Again, I think that if this were in the United States, the 
situation would be different.  But we already have received a number of 
questions about the legal analysis of this event, particularly in light of a 
Japanese special law on nuclear plant damages which calls for strict liability 
and unlimited liability.  There are a number of issues which have not been 
tried before in court; there is only one similar court case about ten years ago, 
which was on a small scale.  The amount of damages in this case would be 
huge.  The government is required to provide necessary support to Tepco 
under that law.  But the details of such support must be determined by a 
resolution of the National Diet.  In that sense, I do not know if it is more of a 
political problem, although I believe that there are quite a few legal issues.  
We are forming a team to address any questions by clients relating to this 
incident.  The big difference compared to [British Petroleum’s 2010 
Deepwater Horizon] oil spill situation is that in Japan, a natural disaster 
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caused the damage.  Another issue to be considered is how to prepare for the 
safety and security of nuclear plants, but there is no reliable legal guidance 
for that problem.  As lawyers we would be interested in being involved in 
any litigation that is brought to court.  But many of our clients are probably 
on the defendants’ side, so unless a very aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyer 
appears, there is unlikely to be litigation.  There is some demand for legal 
services related to this incident, but we are waiting for the development of 
events. 
 
PROFESSOR ARONSON:  Let us ask an aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyer what he 
thinks should be done. 
 
MR. UEYANAGI:  Some of my clients are non-profit organizations and they 
are asking me about the possibility of filing shareholder litigation against 
Tepco and also an injunction against the Fukushima City government to 
protect children while they are playing on the playground.  Tepco has had 
shareholder litigation, and some groups have been warning about the danger 
of tsunamis.  I think Japanese corporations should have heard—and should 
make greater efforts to hear—such minority voices.  On the other hand, such 
minority groups should rethink their own organization and strategies, since 
so far they have unfortunately been largely unsuccessful in getting attention 
from the general public or in effecting any change in politics or government 
policy. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Japanese society and, in particular, its legal profession, are coping 
with the aftermath of both the 2008 financial crisis and the March 2011 
Tōhoku earthquake and related events.  Among the panelists, both are seen 
as “one-time” events that have temporarily reduced the demand for legal 
services in Japan, but will not have a significant long-term impact. 
Despite a lesser economic impact on the legal profession in Japan than 
in the United States or the United Kingdom, the financial crisis of 2008 
nevertheless acted as a catalyst to raise fundamental issues for both Japanese 
law firms and the new Japanese law schools—issues similar to those being 
debated in the United States.  The period from 2000 to 2007 of high growth 
in the demand for legal services, law firm expansion, and confidence in 
undertaking ambitious, broad-ranging reforms of the legal profession has 
given way to a new period characterized by economic headwinds, 
rethinking, and adjustment. 
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The panelists’ discussion of the reaction of the Japanese legal 
profession to recent events contained a number of highly significant points 
for all three of the principal topics:  the fall in demand for legal services 
following the 2008 financial crisis and law firms’ response, legal education 
and the supply of lawyers, and the effect of the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and 
its aftermath. 
With respect to big law firms’ reaction to a period of lower growth, it 
is perhaps unsurprising that Japanese firms would “manage” associates more 
carefully rather than engage in direct firing.  Large firms will continue to 
hire new classes of lawyers who will be actively monitored and managed. 
Whereas the panel discussion four years ago highlighted changes in 
law firm practices under which it would no longer be possible for the 
majority of associates to make partner, this panel discussion suggested that 
new associates would be weeded out and might not be able to remain as 
associates.  It sparked disagreement among the panelists over the question of 
whether big law firm practices in managing associates following the 2008 
financial crisis were, in fact, significantly different from firings and layoffs 
experienced in the United States and the United Kingdom.  This may also 
represent the permanent adoption of more aggressive management practices 
normally associated with U.S. and U.K. firms, as Japanese firms respond to 
clients’ concerns about costs and their own concerns about lawyer quality 
under the new law school system. 
Perhaps the most striking and potentially significant topic was the new 
system of legal education and the increasing number of lawyers.  The 
panelists explicitly embraced a new and different vision of the role of 
lawyers in Japan.  Rather than the traditional small elite with a narrow 
societal role, perhaps analogous to barristers in England, the new model for 
the Japanese bar would be much closer to practices associated with the 
United States:  a bar exam system that certifies minimal competence for 
attorneys and permits the admission of large numbers of them, followed by 
competition among lawyers to fill a wide range of law-related roles in 
society. 
The adoption of this new model of the legal profession is hindered by 
a number of compromises included in the current Japanese system, 
especially the continuation of the role of powerful competitors for law-
related jobs such as licensed tax and intellectual property law specialists.  
However, the panelists were unanimous in their view that the basic course 
has been set, and that despite “growing pains,” there could be no turning 
back to the prior system. 
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Panelists’ views on the recent events surrounding the Tōhoku 
earthquake were necessarily more speculative.  They did not see a long-term 
impact on the legal profession.  Rather, the most significant issues appear to 
involve the intersection between law and broader policy issues.  Specifically, 
under what conditions can Japan, a country with virtually no natural 
resources, continue its emphasis on nuclear power in the face of safety, 
disclosure, and liability issues? 
As noted in the panel discussion four years ago, the Japanese legal 
profession has emerged from its insularity and limited social role.  This 
panel discussion confirms that reform efforts in the direction of a larger 
number of lawyers and a greater social role for attorneys are likely to 
continue, despite recent challenging circumstances that might prompt some 
to long for the “good old days” when lawyers in Japan were a small elite and 
passage of the bar exam assured a comfortable life.  If anything, recent 
events have prompted even stronger “American-style” practices at large law 
firms and have highlighted some of the costs to lawyers and law firms of 
adopting a broader model for the legal profession.  However, by all 
indications the system is in place, the course has been set, and the voyage 
across uncharted waters will continue. 
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APPENDIX A 
LARGEST LAW FIRMS IN JAPAN* 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
*
  39 JIYŪ TO SEIGI, No. 13, at 61 (Supp. 1988); Shoichiro Niwayama & Kazuhiko Yamagishi, Nihon 
ni okeru kyodai hōritsu jimusho no kanōsei [The Possibility of Large-scale Law Offices in Japan] 49 JIYŪ 
TO SEIGI 34, 35 (Nov. 1998); ILS PUBLICATIONS, INC., INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS 2002, 246-47 (2002); 
NIHON KEIZAI SHINBUN, Feb. 25, 2005, at 1; JAPAN FED’N OF BAR ASS’NS, 2009 WHITE 
PAPER ON ATTORNEYS 16 (2009), available at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/en/about/data/WhitePa
per2009.pdf. 
1985 1998 2001 2005 2009 
  
Nishimura & 
Partners  
Nagashima Ohno 
& Tsunematsu  
Mori Hamada 
Matsumoto 
Nishimura & 
Asahi 
26 63 149 198 430 
  
Nagashima & 
Ohno 
Nishimura & 
Partners  
Nagashima Ohno 
& Tsunematsu 
Nagashima Ohno 
& Tsunematsu 
25 62 112 197 320 
  Mori Sogo  Mori Sogo  
Nishimura & 
Partners 
Mori Hamada 
Matsumoto 
23 62 94 183 274 
  Anderson Mori Anderson Mori 
Anderson Mori & 
Tomotsune 
Anderson Mori & 
Tomotsune 
20 50 91 179 260 
  Asahi Asahi Asahi Koma TMI 
20 48 79 140 210 
  Mitsui Yasuda  Mitsui Yasuda TMI  
Tokyo Aoyama 
Aoki Koma 
20 36 65 87 113 
  TMI  
Tokyo Aoyama 
Aoki 
Tokyo Aoyama 
Aoki City Yuwa  
17 33 58 68 102 
  Matsuo Sogo TMI Ohebashi Ohebashi 
17 29 54 64 90 
  Iwata Godo  
Hamada 
Matsumoto City Yuwa    
16 28 41 64   
  Ohebashi Ohebashi     
16 27 40     
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NOTE 1: Numbers indicate number of Japanese lawyers (bengoshi) in 
each firm. 
NOTE 2: No names of firms are available for 1985. 
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APPENDIX B 
FOREIGN LAW FIRMS AND LAWYERS IN JAPAN: 
AFFILIATION BY JOINT ENTERPRISE* 
 
 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
FOREIGN 
LAWYERS 83 95 95 99 109 116 116 
124 
81 operate  
joint 
enterprises 
43 employed 
by others 
JAPANESE 
LAWYERS 
338 403 446 312 536 688 755 
839 
175 operate 
joint 
enterprises 
664 employed 
by others 
JOINT 
ENTERPRISES 23 25 27 19 23 28 30 30 
 
 
                                                      
*
  FOREIGN LAWYER SYSTEM STUDY GROUP, REPORT attach. 8 (Dec. 24, 2009), available at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000051408.pdf. 
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NOTE 1: No data are available for 2004. 
NOTE 2: “Joint Enterprises” through 2003 include only “specified joint 
enterprises” (those operating under statutory practice 
restrictions that were lifted in 2003); starting in 2005, numbers 
include unrestricted “foreign law joint enterprises.” 
NOTE 3: “Japanese Lawyers” are those operating joint enterprises and 
those employed by Japanese lawyers or foreign lawyers 
operating joint enterprises. 
NOTE 4: “Foreign Lawyers” are registered foreign lawyers who operate 
joint enterprises or who are employed by Japanese lawyers or 
foreign lawyers operating joint enterprises. 
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APPENDIX C 
BAR PASSAGE RATES UNDER THE LAW SCHOOL SYSTEM* 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
*
  HŌSŌ YŌSEI SEIDO NI KAN SURU KENTŌ WAAKINGU CHIIMU [INVESTIGATION WORKING TEAM FOR 
THE TRAINING SYSTEM FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS], HŌSŌ YŌSEI SEIDO NI KAN SURU KENTŌ WAAKINGU 
CHIIMU NI OKERU KENTŌ KEKKA (TORIMATOME) [SHIRYO] [INVESTIGATION RESULT OF THE INVESTIGATION 
WORKING TEAM FOR THE TRAINING SYSTEM FOR LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (SUMMARY) [APPENDICES], 
Appendix 11 (heisei 22 nen 7 gatsu 6 nichi) [July 6, 2010]. 
  2006 2007 2007 2009 
STUDENTS WITH LAW BACKGROUND         
Number Taking Bar Exam 2091 2641 3002 3274 
Number Passing Bar Exam 1009 1215 1331 1266 
Passage Rate 48.25% 46.01% 44.34% 38.67% 
STUDENTS WITHOUT 
LAW BACKGROUND         
Number Taking Bar Exam 0 1966 3259 4118 
Number Passed 0 636 734 777 
Passage Rate 0.00% 32.35% 22.52% 18.87% 
OVERALL BAR PASSAGE RATE 48.30% 40.20% 33.00% 27.60% 
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NOTE 1: “Students with Law Background” refers to law school 
students/graduates with a background in law from their 
undergraduate studies (whether or not they were law majors) who 
qualify for a shortened two-year course in law school (kishūsha). 
NOTE 2: “Students Without Law Background” refers to law school 
students/graduates without a qualifying law background who take 
the regular three-year law school course (mishūsha). 
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APPENDIX D 
OUTLINE OF LEGAL REFORM IN JAPAN:  
THE “THREE PILLARS” OF LEGAL REFORM  
PILLAR ONE: 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM – “RESPONDING TO PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS” 
Reform of the Civil Justice System 
• Comprehensive Response to Intellectual Property Cases 
o Establishment of “patent court” divisions in Tokyo and Osaka 
o Reforms regarding expert witnesses 
• Improving Access to Justice 
o Reducing costs 
o Making courts more accessible 
 Geographical distribution of courts 
 Introduction of information technology during various 
phases of a court’s work 
o Strengthening the Civil Legal Aid system 
o Considering implementation of a plaintiff class action system 
Reform of the Criminal Justice System 
• Establishing a Public Defense System for Defendants 
Accommodating Internationalization 
  
PILLAR TWO: 
THE LEGAL PROFESSION – “SUPPORTING THE JUSTICE SYSTEM” 
Expand the Population of Lawyers 
• Increase Supply of Lawyers 
• Secure Lawyers from Diverse Backgrounds 
Reform the Legal Education System 
• Introduction of Law Schools 
• New Bar Exam Reflecting New Legal Education System 
Reforming the Role of Lawyers 
• Social Responsibility of Lawyers: “Doctors for the People’s Social Lives” 
• Expanding Access to Lawyers 
o Make information about fees, past performance, expertise, etc. 
readily available 
• Expanding the Expertise of Lawyers 
o Continuing education 
o Promote cooperation with foreign firms 
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PILLAR THREE: 
THE PEOPLE – “POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM” 
Increased Participation 
• Introduction of the “Lay Judge” (Jury) System 
• Securing Conciliators from Diverse Backgrounds 
• Consideration of Public Opinion in Judicial Appointments and Nominations 
Making the Legal System More Readily Understandable to the General Public 
Improving Education of the General Public Regarding the Justice System 
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APPENDIX E 
CHRONOLOGY OF LEGAL REFORM IN JAPAN 
1999 Training period at the Legal Research and Training Institute (“LRTI”) 
shortened from two years to eighteen months. 
1999 Number of successful bar examinees reaches 1,000 for the first time. 
Jul. 1999 Justice System Reform Council established to examine the justice 
system. 
2000 Population of registered Japanese lawyers is 17,126 
2001 990 (2.5%) examinees pass the bar exam. 
Jun. 2001 The Justice System Reform Council releases its recommendations for 
reforms to the justice system. 
• Graduates of new law schools are intended to have a 70-80% 
bar passage rate. 
• Goal of at least 1,500 successful bar examinees annually by 
2004 under the old bar examination. 
• Goal of at least 3,000 successful bar examinees annually by 
2010 under the new bar examination (with the goal of having 
phased out the old bar examination). 
• Goal of 50,000 practicing lawyers by 2018. 
 
Apr. 2004 Sixty-eight American-style law schools begin operation.  Of 72,800 
applicants, 2,792 are admitted. 
May 2004 The Diet passes the law instating the Saiban-in (lay judge) system. 
2005 Amendments to the Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling of 
Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers come in to effect, permitting 
partnerships between Japanese and foreign lawyers and allowing 
foreign firms to hire Japanese lawyers. 
2006  The new bar exam is offered for the first time.  In total, 1,009 (48.3%) 
examinees pass the new bar exam.  The old bar exam continues to be 
offered. 
2006 Training period at the LRTI further shortened to one year. 
Apr. 2006 There are now seventy-four law schools in operation. 
May 2009 The Saiban-in system is implemented.  The first trial is held in August 
2009. 
2010 2,074 (25.4%) examinees pass the new bar exam. 
Dec. 2010 Population of registered Japanese lawyers is 28,868. 
2011 Population of Japanese lawyers exceeded 30,000. 
2011 The old bar exam is scheduled to be phased out after this year’s 
examination. 
